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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to de te rmine whether 
appellant is within the ju r i sd ic t ion of the 
Juvenile Court by reason of the commiss ion 
of the offense of in terfer ing with an a r r e s t 
o r detention, in violation of UCA 76-8-305 , 
and the offense of consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage , in violation of UCA 32-7-15. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was t r i ed to the Cour t . F r o m 
a verd ic t and judgment of guilty of the offenses 
charged, appellant appea ls . 
-1-
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R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks r e v e r s a l of the 
judgments and a new t r i a l . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 29, 1973, officer Kenneth 
Vee P a l m e r , a San Juan County, Utah, 
Deputy Sheriff, was driving his pat rol car 
nor th from Bluff, Utah, when he observed a 
vehicle dr iven by a person whom he knew did 
not have a d r i v e r ' s l i cense . T. 4 - 5 . Officer 
P a l m e r stopped the vehicle , and reques ted 
that the d r i v e r , one Linda Lehi , get into his 
pat rol ca r , so that he could i ssue her a c i t a -
tion for driving without a valid d r i v e r ' s l i cense . 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T. 5. When the officer and M s . Lehi w e r e 
in the c a r , officer P a l m e r began issuing a 
ci tat ion. T. 5. 
Officer P a l m e r test if ied that the appellant , 
who had been in M s . Lehi f s vehicle along with 
s eve ra l o t h e r s , came up to the off icer ' s 
window, and reques ted that he dr ive her 
back to Bluff. T. 5. The officer fur ther 
test if ied that af ter he told the appellant that 
he would only consider her reques t after he 
had finished the citation, she responded by 
t h r e a t e n i n g " the officer, tel l ing him that he 
could not take possess ion of M s . Leh i ' s 
vehicle . T. 6. Officer P a l m e r acknowledged 
that appel lant ' s comments did not cause h im 
to fear physical violence f rom appellant o r 
any physical act by the appellant to take the 
-3-
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vehic le . T. 13-14, 18. Officer P a l m e r then 
told the appellant that she was in terfer ing 
with his work and reques ted that she leave 
the a r e a . T. 6. Appellant complied with this 
r eques t . T. 6-7, 14. 
After appellant left, officer P a l m e r 
test if ied that he then placed M s . Lehi under 
a r r e s t for driving under the influence of 
intoxicating alcohol . T. 15-16. Appellant then 
re tu rned to the pat rol ca r and again began 
talking to the officer. T. 7. Officer P a l m e r 
again o rde red appellant to leave and threa tened 
to a r r e s t the g i r l for in ter fer ing . T. 7. In 
r e sponse , appellant said to the officer, "You 
fuckin1 pukeM. T. 8. Officer P a l m e r then 
placed the appellant under a r r e s t for both 
in ter fer ing with an officer and the unlawful 
-4-
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consumption of an alcoholic beverage by a 
minor . T. 8. Officer P a l m e r acknowledged 
that appel lant ' s profanity was the p r i m a r y 
factor in his decis ion to make an a r r e s t for 
in ter fer ing with an officer. T. 8, 18. The 
officer fur ther admit ted that nothing in appel lant ' s 
conduct requ i red h im to do anything out of 
the o rd ina ry to effect Ms . Leh i ' s a r r e s t . T. 
19. Officer P a l m e r a lso test if ied that 
appellant offered no physical r e s i s t a n c e to 
her a r r e s t , although a th i rd person was 
a r r e s t e d for in ter fer ing . T. 19. At no t ime 
did appel lant ' s speech or conduct tend to provoke 
a physical o r violent confrontation with the 
officer. T. 18, 20. 
Officer P a l m e r a lso testif ied that he was 
of the opinion that appellant was under the 
-5-
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influence of an intoxicating beverage at the 
t i m e of the incident. T. 8-12. However, 
the officer did admit that appellant was well 
groomed, that he r speech was c lear and 
unders tandable , T. 8. , and that his decis ion 
to make an a r r e s t on the alcohol charge came 
only after appellant used profanity. T. 11. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH 
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED 
OF INTERFERING WITH AN 
ARREST OR DETENTION IS 
OVERBROAD AND INFRINGES 
UPON APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
OF FREE SPEECH. 
Appellant was convicted of in terfer ing 
with an a r r e s t o r detention under Section 7 6 - 8 -
305 of the Utah Cr imina l Code, which provides : 
-6 -
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Section 76 - -8 -305 , INTERFERING 
WITH ARREST OR DETENTION. A 
person is guilty of a c lass B m i s d e -
meanor when he intentionally in te r fe r s 
with a person recognized to be a 
law enforcement official seeking to 
effect an a r r e s t o r detention of 
himself or another r e g a r d l e s s of 
whether t he r e is a legal bas i s for 
the a r r e s t . 
Appellant submits that the application of 
UCA 76-8-305 to the facts in this c a se , in 
which the lower court construed the s ta tu tory 
t e r m " in te r fe r ing" to include profanity d i rec ted 
at a police officer effecting the a r r e s t of 
another , demons t r a t e s the ove r reach ing effect 
this provision can have on F i r s t Amendment 
f r e edoms . 
Appellant does recognize that not a l l 
speech is protected speech and that the State 
has a legi t imate i n t e r e s t in regulat ing o r 
prohibit ing speech which by i ts ve ry na tu re 
-7-
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tends to inci te violence o r d i s tu rb the public 
peace . See, State v. M u s s e r , 175 P . 2d 724, 
731 (Utah, 1946), vacated 333 U.S. 95, 101 
(1948); Shields v. Toronto , 395 P . 2d 829, 
835 (Utah, 1964). Yet the State c lea r ly cannot 
p r o s c r i b e words , although vulgar and offensive, 
which a r e protec ted by the F i r s t and Four teen th 
Amendments to the United States Consti tution. 
See, e . g . , Cohen v. California, 403 U.S . 15, 
29 L. Ed 2d 284 (1971). Appel lant ' s profanity, 
T. 8. , c l ea r ly fal ls within the a r e a of 
protected speech, s ince it cannot, eas argued 
infra, be included in a c l a s s of "fighting w o r d s " 
which can legi t imate ly be p rosc r ibed . 
The cour t s have often been called upon 
to balance the r ight of f r ee speech with the 
governmen t ' s i n t e r e s t in o r d e r l y and effective 
-8-
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law enforcement admin is t ra t ion , in ca se s 
where profanity is d i rec ted at police officers 
while performing the i r official dut ies , Lewis 
v. New O r l e a n s , U.S . , 39 L. Ed 2d 
214 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405-U.S . 518, 
31 L. Ed 2d 408 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampsh i r e , 315 U.S . 568, 86 L Ed 1031 
(1942). 
Lewis v. New O r l e a n s , supra , p r e sen t s 
facts s i m i l a r to those in this c a se , where a 
police officer, in stopping a c a r , encountered 
verba l abuse (In Lewis , "You god damn m. f. 
pol ice . • . ") f rom a pa s sange r while a t tempting 
to invest igate the d r i v e r . The Lewis court 
ruled invalid a conviction under an ord inance 
prohibit ing obscene or opprobr ious language 
d i rec ted at a police officer in the pe r fo rmance 
-9-
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of his duty, and noted that under Chaplinsky 
v. New H a m p s h i r e , supra , a s ta te can only 
p r o s c r i b e a specific category of nfighting words 1 
words ". . . which by the i r ve ry u t te rance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immedia te 
b reach of the peace" . Gooding v. Wilson, 
supra , at 523. In Chaplinsky, the cour t 
adopted New H a m p s h i r e ' s definition of fighting 
words a s : 
". . . The t e s t is what men of common 
intel l igence would understand would be 
words likely to cause an ave rage 
a d d r e s s e e to f i g h t . . . " . 315 U. S. 568, 
573. 
The fighting words l imitat ion imposed by 
the cour t s is c ruc ia l to the protect ion of our 
F i r s t Amendment f r eedoms . Thus , the fa i lure 
of UCA 76-8-305 to exp re s s ly l imi t i ts 
application to a na r rowly defined category of 
-10-
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fighting words which could logically be under -
stood as likely to in ter fer with an a r r e s t o r 
detention r a i s e s a se r ious question as to the 
s ta tu te ' s chilling effect on F i r s t Amendment 
r igh t s , pa r t i cu la r ly if this broad in te rpre ta t ion 
is encouraged through judicial construction* 
Gooding v. Wilson, supra , at 520; Lewis v. 
New O r l e a n s , supra . The potential for abuse 
is ever p re sen t , providing police officers with 
a convenient means of re ta l ia t ing against 
offensive but protected conduct. This fear 
was expressed by J u s t i c e Powell in his con-
c u r r i n g opinion in Lewis . 39 L. Ed 2d 214, 
at 221. Jus t i ce Powell fur ther emphasized 
that a p rope r l imitat ion on the scope of Ithe 
s ta tute would not be incompatible with the 
pe r fo rmance of a police off icer ' s dut ies , 
-11-
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par t i cu la r ly when t h e r e is an o therwise 
valid bas i s for an a r r e s t . 
Section 76-8-305 of the Utah Cr imina l 
Code should the re fo re be construed as applying 
only to the use of fighting words which would 
logically c r ea t e an eminent possibi l i ty of a 
violent confrontation calculated to in te r fe re 
with an a r r e s t or detention. 
Given this construct ion, appel lant ' s use 
of the expletive "You fuckin' puke", T. 8. , 
is not a fighting word which can be legi t imate ly 
p rosc r ibed by the State* This contention is 
s t rengthened by the officers admissioi* that he 
had no impulse to s t r ike or o therwise fight 
with the child as a r e su l t of her profanity. T. 
20. Indeed, the expletive used is a childish 
one, typical of a f rus t ra ted adolescent , and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is hardly designed to provoke a violent 
confrontation, especia l ly with a seasoned 
law enforcement officer who can be expected 
to e x e r c i s e a higher degree of r e s t r a i n t than 
the ave rage ci t izen. Lewis v. New O r l e a n s , 
39 L Ed 2d 214, at 220 (Just ice Powell , 
concurr ing) ; See, a l so , The Mrodei Pena l 
Code, S. 250. I, comment 14 (Tent. Draft No. 
13, 1961). 
Appel lant ' s conviction is the re fo re 
i m p r o p e r , and mus t be r e v e r s e d , 
•II. THE STATUTE UNDER . WHICH 
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED 
FOR INTERFERING WITH AN 
ARREST OR DETENTION DOES 
NOT APPLY TO PURE SPEECH. 
Appellant was convicted under Section 
- 1 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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76-8-305 of the Utah Cr imina l Code. On 
i ts face the s ta tute appea r s to l imit i ts 
application to force , or conceivably t h r e a t s 
of force which in fact consti tute actual i n t e r -
fe rence with an a r r e s t o r detention. In State 
v. Sandman, 286 P . 2d 1060 (Utah, 1955), 
the Utah Supreme C o u r t , in const ruing a 
f o r m e r in te r fe rence s ta tu te , UCA 76-28-54 
(1953), defined the t e r m " in t e r f e r ence" a s : 
"Such in te r fe rence o r r e s i s t a n c e need 
not be in the fo rm of physical fo rce 
o r violence, but it is sufficient that 
t h e r e be some d i rec t act ion amounting 
to aff i rmat ive in te r fe rence . ". 286 
P . 2d 1060, at 1062. 
Appel lant ' s profanity c l ea r ly does not 
fall within the definition adopted by the cour t 
in Sandman. T h e r e was no fo rce , o r t h r e a t s 
of fo rce , which substant ia l ly in ter fered with 
the off icer ' s pe r fo rmance of his duty. Compare 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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T. 13, 14, and T. 19. See, a l so , 67 C. J . S. 
Obst ruct ing J u s t i c e , S. 5 (b). In McGeorge 
v. Commonwealth, 35 S. W. 2d 530 (Ky. 1931), 
the court ruled that Kentucky's obs t ruc t ing 
jus t i ce s ta tute included physical violence o r 
fo rce , o r t h r e a t s to that end, but not the 
curs ing of a police officer. 35 S. W. 2d 530, 
at 531. 
The re fo re , s ince UCA 76-8-305 was 
mis takenly applied to speech not amounting 
to actual in te r fe rence , appel lan t ' s conviction 
cannot stand. 
III. THE FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE FINDING 
OF THE COURT THAT APPELLANT 
COMMITTED THE OFFENSES 
CHARGED. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In o r d e r to de t e rmine whether a child 
is within the ju r i sd ic t ion of the Juveni le 
Court by r ea son of the commiss ion of an 
offense, the court mus t s ta te with pa r t i cu -
l a r i ty the findings of fact upon which it b a s e s 
i ts ju r i sd ic t ion over the child. UCA 55-
10-100; Rules 20, 23 , UJCR 1970; In Re 
Gault, 387 U.S . 1, 58 L Ed 2d 527, 563 
(1967). 
The court below failed to i s sue and 
es tabl i sh findings sufficient to show beyond 
a reasonab le doubt that appellant commit ted 
the offenses charged. The r e c o r d is 
absolutely devoid of any findings concerning 
the charge of in ter fer ing with an a r r e s t o r 
detention, o ther than the ba r e a s s e r t i o n by 
the court that the s ta tute in quest ion, UCA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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76-8-305, should be broadly construed to 
cover the facts of this case. T. 30-31. The 
record is equally devoid of any findings 
supporting the court 's conclusion that appellant 
had committed the offense of unlawful 
consumption of an alcoholic beverage, other 
than a conclusiary statement by the court as 
to its satisfaction with the officer's testimony. 
T. 30-31. 
The court 's findings and conclusions a re 
therefore insufficient to support appellant's 
convictions of the offenses charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding that appellant is within the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court by reason 
of the commission of the offense of interfering 
with an a r r e s t or detention and the offense
 0f Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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unlawful consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage must be reversed. Appellant 
must be granted a new tr ial . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Eric Swenson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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